



Records and Social Domination: Historical Background

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ABSTRACT

In this article we start from the thesis, consolidated at the beginning of the twenty-first century, that there are links between domination systems and records systems, to propose a genealogical review of these concepts and some other associated ones. First, we approach the codification of bureaucracy carried out by Max Weber in 1922. Second, we return to the ancient Tabularium of Rome and, from it, to the German theory of the *ius archivi*. Thirdly, we review the texts in which Michel Foucault identified the mechanisms of surveillance and punishment, as well as the ordering of discourse. Next, we return to the vision that Jean Baudrillard exposed about the culture of simulacrum in contemporary societies. We end with the identification, short and quickly, of some ideas whose validity should be checked against the digital environments in which we currently operate.

Keywords: bureaucracy; discipline; domination; power system; records system.

INTRODUCTION

One must be a nomad, crossing ideas like one crosses countries and cities.
Francis Picabia. *Writings*

A tower of which the very shape was wicked.
G.K. Chesterton. *The man who was Thursday*

This right of access of citizens to public archives and records is not unlimited, but finds its limits in article 105.b) of the State Constitution when it expressly refers to their legal status (“the law shall regulate”) in terms of the exercise of the right of access to administrative files and records. It is, therefore, a right that is not a fundamental right. Supreme Court Decision STS 502/2023, of April 21st.

In 2002, Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook edited, for journal *Archival Science*, a double monographic issue which, under title *Archives, records, and power: The making of modern memory*, collected contributions to research on the relationships between systems of power and document systems at different times and from different perspectives of the main scholars of archival thought (Schwartz; Cook, 2002). Although this was not the first approach to the subject, which has already been discussed in professional and scientific publications before, we can consider these essays as triggers for an entire stream of research that, over the years, has addressed the exploration of the archives of oppressed groups or groups which have been excluded at different moments in the history of official discourse: women, ethnic or linguistic minorities, colonized peoples, LGBTBI collectives and so on.

As this research on the interactions between documents and power progressed over time, other issues gained visibility, particularly that of the democratization of information, as systems of power were forced to be more transparent and responsible for their actions in democratic regimes. In basic terms, the evolution of information and communication technologies would not have been alien to this change of perspective in the approach to power documents and the power of documents. In filigree, if throughout history systems of power used the documents they produced as tools of domination, in the 21st century and in democratic societies this would no longer be the case, because such societies demand these systems of power, by means of more demanding laws in relation to the ruling elites, all possible information about their actions, and the provision of this information has been facilitated by the intense digitalization of all spheres of public and private life.

Even if this overview is true, for one to speak of the links between documents and power, one must eliminate ambiguities and identify, to some extent, these and other related concepts and explore their genealogy. If we review the literature on the subject, we find that these links have generally been more complex than misuse or concealment, although historically both have undoubtedly existed. It is for this reason that, in this text, we concentrate our efforts on exposing some classic notions of power and documents, in their different forms of dossier,

discourse and information. The scope of this exposition is limited: first, we resort to sources that are not always archival and confined to the field of European thought, to review, without intending to be exhaustive, some ideas in the context of their emergence. These ideas are well known and our approach is not original, although their reorganization in this text may give rise to reflection. In any case, they should be understood as literary tropes that serve as a suggestion to guide a possible essay to complete the present.

METHODS

To fulfill the purpose of this text, the literary analysis method was used, understood as an integration of narrative analysis, discourse and literary warrant (Gilliland; McKemmish, 2006).

In what follows, we prefer expression “system of domination” to “system of power”, for consistency with the Weberian terminology identified in the next section.

In principle, we understand the “social dimension of archives” in the sense that the *continuum* of documents model understands the “pluralize” dimension, that is, as the documents’ life in society, in addition to the organizations by which they were produced (Upward, 1996, 1997; Frings-Hessami;

This dimension includes matters such as transparency, open data, open government, access to electronic office files, archive websites that display digitized documents, databases created by restitution commissions to recover rights, databases that contributed to managing the pandemic, social networks or the interrelationships between different information agents on the Internet. For example, a local government may have executive authority over a certain social aid, in relation to an autonomous or federal government, which will have regulatory authority; in relation to a national government, which will have authority over framework laws; in relation to an intergovernmental organization, which will have authority over the publication of recommendations and guidelines; in relation to a third sector organization, which will publish statistics or define indicators; in relation to the tweets or reels of those benefiting or harmed by such aid; and so forth up to an infinite number of possible interactions and dependencies. It is important that we maintain this idea of interconnections on the internet. It should also be noted that, in this archival architecture, everything is, or everything can be, an archive.

This dimension is not always, or has not always been, present in document management. In fact, and if we limit ourselves to Western societies, the archive has not historically been the “normal” place for social concerns or demands, regardless of whether it has been used for this purpose; not everything was considered, until very recently, an archive. In the next section, we will explore a classic perception of document systems and their links to systems of domination.

RESULT ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Bureaucracy and documents

When speaking of the concept of power, it seems appropriate to resort to one of the classical sources of European culture. Max Weber, in his masterpiece *Economy and society*, defined “power” as “[...] la probabilidad de imponer la propia voluntad, dentro de una relación social, aun contra toda resistencia y cualquiera que sea el fundamento de esa probabilidade [...]” (Weber, 2002, p. 43)¹. For Weber, power is amorphous: there are infinite situations in which someone can exercise power over others, individually or collectively. Therefore, we must turn to the specific concept of “domination”, which is “[...] la probabilidad de encontrar obediencia a un mandato de determinado contenido entre personas dadas[...]” (Weber, 2002, p. 43)². Finally, “discipline” is “[...] la probabilidad de encontrar obediencia para un mandato por parte de un conjunto de personas que, en virtud de actitudes arraigadas, sea pronta, simple y automática [...]” (Weber, 2002, p. 43)³. This concept of discipline involves the habitual obedience of the masses without resistance or criticism. Domination, for its part, involves the effective command of someone over others; does not necessarily bring with it the coexistence of an administrative framework and an association, but rather the presence of at least one of them (Weber, 2002). In this context, we are interested in domination by means of an administrative framework.

According to Weber, some forms of domination have, if they have certain properties, the condition of legal domination, bureaucracy being “[...] la estructura pura de dominación del cuadro administrativo” (Weber, 2002, p. 175)⁴. Bureaucracy is, delicately speaking, the government of officials and, as Anthony Giddens explains, Weber did not codify a model of government that was necessarily desirable, but also not necessarily undesirable. According to Giddens, for Weber, bureaucracy was the only effective method of government in contemporary societies, which is why he articulated its properties in order to know them precisely; that is, he constructed an ideal type, not an archetype (Giddens, 1998, p. 373). In Weber’s codification, there are two properties of legal domination that are of particular interest to us:

1. That who obeys, only obeys as a member of the association and only obeys “the law”.
2. The administrative principle of adherence to the dossier rules, “even when oral declarations are in fact the rule or are prescribed; at least the recitals, proposals and decisions are set out in writing, as well as provisions and ordinances of all types. The dossier and the continued activity of employees make the office the backbone of every modern form of association activity.”

1 Translation: “[...] the probability of imposing one’s will, within a social relationship, even against all resistance and whatever the basis of this probability [...]” (Weber, 2002, p. 43, editorial translation).

2 Translation: “[...] the probability of finding obedience to a mandate of certain content among certain people [...]” (Weber, 2002, p. 43, editorial translation).

3 Translation: “[...] the probability of finding obedience to a mandate by a group of people that, due to ingrained attitudes, is quick, simple and automatic [...]” (Weber, 2002, p. 43, editorial translation).

4 Translation: “[...] the pure structure of domination of the administrative framework” (Weber, 2002, p. 175, editorial translation).

Furthermore, modern bureaucracy

[...] se basa en documentos (expedientes) conservados en borradores o minutas, y en un cuerpo de empleados subalternos y de escribientes de toda clase. El conjunto de los empleados que trabajan a las órdenes de un jefe junto con sus archivos de documentos y expedientes constituye un “negociado” (Weber, 2002, p. 717)⁵.

We must maintain the idea that business is structured in hierarchies, in very rigid pyramids, especially due to its value in explaining the operation of European bureaucracies in the 20th century.

For Weber, the idea of a documentary system linked to a system of domination was part of the proper operation of bureaucracy, not only in contemporary Western societies, but in any model that met the requirements of being subject to the law and based on the dossier. If something was wrong in the realization of this ideal type, we add, it was due to the fact that, *caeteris paribus*, the principle of obedience to the law was not being fulfilled in the system of domination.

The corollary is simple: in Weber’s model, the archive does not appear in the first instance as having a social objective, but as an instrument for a bureaucracy to manage its affairs effectively. There is no conflict between systems of domination and document systems; on the contrary, the latter are instrumental to the former, which cannot function properly without them.

The next section will address how this conception was supported by Western history, using two well-known examples.

Employees and document systems

The perception of a document system supporting a system of domination, although not always verbalized, has been reasonably stable, at least since Ancient Rome, in most European cultures. The Roman Tabularium was governed by fourteen quaestors, at the lowest rank in the magistracy; and administered by apparators, that is, by lower-level public officials, paid by the State. Furthermore, the Tabularium never ceased to be, at least, a division of the Aerarium (Posner, 1972; Duranti, 1989). It can be argued that these document managers managed them to satisfy the interests of the system of domination on which their salaries and promotions depended. This does not, in principle, have negative implications: let us say that the normal behavior of a system of domination is precisely to produce and manage documents that meet its needs and interests. Thereafter, two classic statements are derived related to how archives came closer, or not, to the societies within which they existed:

1. First, there is nothing natural, nothing organic, in the production and management of documents, nor are they faithful and exact reflections of reality (Schwartz, 2000). On the

5 Translation: “[...] is based on documents (dossiers) preserved in drafts or minutes, and on a staff made of subordinate employees and scribes of all kinds. The set of employees who work under the orders of a leader together with their archives of documents and dossiers constitutes a ‘negotiated deal’” (Weber, 2002, p. 717, editorial translation).

contrary, documents only reflect that part of reality that a specific system of domination feeds on to achieve its objectives, exert pressure on it to reduce its limits to those that the system of domination can or needs to control. The remainder is left out.

2. Second, or as an extension of the first, “[...] lo que se registra no es nunca lo que sucedió” (Trace, 2002, p. 48, our translation)⁶, it is precisely the segment of what happened that a given system of domination needs to fulfill its goals. Therefore, not everything is an archive: in a specific context, an archive is only an archive when the system of domination says it is in that context.

This does not mean that, throughout history, systems of domination have not misused document systems. In literature, examples are abundant: from the Donation of Constantine document to the alleged theft of state secrets by former president Donald Trump, passing through Hitler’s apocryphal diaries, the elimination of documents that could reveal British High Command’s bad actions during the First World War, Watergate, the elimination of documents that accused Nazi war criminals hiding in Canada, the Heiner case, the wiretapping of Commissioner Villarejo in Spain, the alleged counterfaction of vaccination certificates by Brazil’s former president Bolsonaro, or the destruction of archives in contemporary wars, among many other cases. Power misused documents; but this does not invalidate the argument that systems of domination are supported by document systems and, therefore, these document systems only collect information that is useful for the systems of domination on which they serve as a basis.

Perhaps the best-known case in Europe, related to the legal connections between document systems and systems of domination, despite its short duration, is that of the *ius archivi* theory, which was shaped from the end of the 16th century until the end of the 17th century in the Germanic States, highlighting the works of jurists Rutger Ruland, Nicolaus Mylerus and Ahasverus Fritsch. At the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the lordly possessions and the documents that had justified them since the Middle Ages were severely compromised. In this context, Georg Aebbtlin, secretary of the Ulm chancellery, defined the purpose of document management as follows: “[...] asegurar las posesiones señoriales, con sus jurisdicciones, derechos y privilegios” (Head, 2016, p. 499, our translation)⁷. To achieve this end, Aebbtlin articulated *in nuce* what would become the *Registraturprinzip*, which would acquire so much strength in Prussian document management and, moreover, in the different document management systems of the Common Law tradition, not so much that of Roman Law. For Aebbtlin, the *Registratur* was “[...] el arte o la ciencia y el estudio del modo en que reunir y conservar los instrumentos públicos y otros documentos escritos de cualquier dominio, señorío o magistratura, de manera ordenada” (Head, 2016, p. 499, our translation)⁸. German

6 Original: “What is recorded is never simply ‘what happened’” (Trace, 2002, p. 48).

7 Original: “[...] to secure ‘lordly possessions with their attached jurisdictions, rights and privileges” (Head, 2016, p. 499).

8 Original: “[...] the art or science and study of how to gather and preserve the public instruments and other written records of any dominion, lordship, or magistracy, in an ordered way” (Head, 2016, p. 499).

authors of the 16th century considered this *Registratur* different from *archivum*, a “[...] tesoro de privilegios y documentos probatorios but not exclusive, in fact, part of a larger document management system (Head, 2016, p. 502, our translation)⁹.

Between approximately 1604 and 1667, several German jurists developed, from this idea, the concept of *probatio per archivum*, which largely inherited the view that Roman Law had of public faith and the probative value of documents preserved in the Tabularium, and which formed the basis of *iusarchivi*, which Nicolaus Mylerus defined as “[...] un conjunto de derechos procedimentales, que descansaban sobre la soberanía, y que garantizaban la validez legal de los instrumentos que se encontraban en los archivos de los príncipes y de las ciudades” (Head, 2013, p. 917, our translation)¹⁰. Later on, with the publication of *Tractatus de iure archivi etcancellariae*, by Ahasverus Fritsch, the *ius archivi* theorists of developed a model that adapted the principles of public faith from Roman Law to the Germanic States, and that deepened the idea that the archive was an instrument to reinforce the authority of princes; consequently, not everything was archived, just what the princes, or their officials, considered necessary (Head, 2013).

This perception of bureaucracy, according to which document systems are instrumental to systems of domination and, therefore, there is nothing perverse about them, can be analyzed from another perspective that reveals different nuances, as explained in the following section.

Order and discipline

Historically, Western bureaucracies have enabled mechanisms of domination that do not contradict the fact that they are structures of administrative framework domination, that is, structures within the legal system. Regarding the means by which systems of domination have subjugated their subjects, we are interested, at this point, in Michel Foucault’s analysis of domination, in two senses: 1) as discipline exercised by means of surveillance and punishment; and 2) as discipline exercised by means of the order of discourse. In his story about the emergence of prison, the French author, in addition to reviewing the evolution of concepts such as torture, punishment, sentence or prison, revived the well-known idea of panopticon from American jurist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham. A panopticon is a model of a building, a tower to be precise, with an architecture that allows one or more guards, undetermined, unknown, to permanently keep watch from a physical position of pre-eminence, for example, windows on the upper floors, one or more guards who are in a physical position of subordination, for example, a courtyard, from which they cannot see who is watching them, although they are aware that they are being watched. Conceived as a prison model, the implementation of which we can see in many places, the architecture of the panopticon was also used, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, to build schools, factories, convents, libraries and even hotels (Foucault, 2002). In its most refined version, a panopticon does

9 Original: “[...] the treasury of privileges and probative documents” (Head, 2016, p. 502).

10 Original: “[...] a set of procedural rights, resting on sovereignty, that guaranteed the legal validity of the instruments found in princely and urban archives” (Head, 2013, p. 917).

not need guards, it must only instill in the person being watched the idea that they are being watched. If this is achieved effectively enough, the panopticon will become an automatic, non-individualized surveillance machine. It is this refinement that allows dictatorial regimes to use document systems as control systems: it is not necessary, nor probably feasible, for a dictatorship to constantly monitor its subjects; but if one can make them believe that the regime maintains an individualized dossier on each of them, a dossier with a record of each of their activities, whether permitted or not, then this dictatorship, based on document systems, will have citizens who comply with such discipline with no discussion (Ketelaar, 2007).

This is not the only text in which Michel Foucault explored the subtle relationships between dominant and dominated. In his speech at Collège de France in 1970, which marked the split between his previous thought and his work program for future years, he showed that the discourse exercised by the system of domination – here, as far as we are concerned and, *mutatis mutandis*, “discourse” works interchangeably with “document” – it always imposes an order on reality, which otherwise becomes uncontrollable:

Supongo que en toda sociedad la producción del discurso está a la vez controlada, seleccionada y redistribuida por cierto número de procedimientos que tienen por función conjurar sus poderes y peligros, dominar el acontecimiento aleatorio y esquivar su pesada y temible materialidad. (Foucault, 1999, p. 14)¹¹.

Foucault meticulously codified the mechanisms by which discourse, in a given society, is organized. There are external exclusion procedures, the first being prohibition, which, in turn, takes three forms: taboo of the object, ritual of the circumstance and privileged right of the speaking subject. The second exclusion procedure is that of separation and rejection; and the third is critical, it is that of the opposition between true and false, which is not placed in terms of the truth value of a proposition within a given discourse, but in terms of the will to truth between discourses and throughout history (Foucault, 1999). Parallel to these external procedures, Foucault also codified a set of exclusion procedures, internal to the discourse itself. The first is commentary, or the discrimination between original discourse and discourse that comment on such original discourse; the second, the author’s principle, understood as “[...] principio de agrupación del discurso, como unidad y origen de sus significaciones, como foco de su coherencia” (Foucault, 1999, p. 29)¹². There is a third internal exclusion procedure, the principle of organization of disciplines, which are oriented towards a certain plane of objects, establish a theoretical horizon and, to that extent, exclude discourse that does not suit this horizon, regardless of whether such discourse is true or false (Foucault, 1999).

11 Translation: “I suppose that in every society, the production of discourse is simultaneously controlled, selected and redistributed by a certain number of procedures with the function of conjuring its powers and dangers, dominating the random event and avoiding its heavy and fearful materiality” (Foucault, 1999, p. 14, editorial translation).

12 Translation: “[...] principle of grouping discourse, as the unity and origin of its meanings, as the focus of its coherence” (Foucault, 1999, p. 29, editorial translation).

The procedures for delimiting the order of discourse are not social; quite the contrary, they restrict the indiscriminate access of most individuals to discourse, prohibit the right to it, or better yet, codify the conditions of its use:

Se trata de determinar las condiciones de su utilización, de imponer a los individuos que los dicen cierto número de reglas y no permitir de esta forma el acceso a ellos a todo el mundo. Enrarecimiento, esta vez, de los sujetos que hablan; nadie entrará en el orden del discurso si no satisface ciertas exigencias o si no está, de entrada, cualificado para hacerlo. Para ser más preciso: no todas las partes del discurso son igualmente accesibles e inteligibles; algunas están claramente protegidas (diferenciadas y diferenciadas) mientras que otras aparecen casi abiertas a todos los vientos y se ponen sin restricción previa a disposición de cualquier sujeto que hable (Foucault, 1999, p. 38-39)¹³.

In this sense, Foucault also codified a third group of discourse control procedures, not oriented in this case to the discourses themselves, but to the conditions of their use: first, ritual, which “[...] define la cualificación que deben poseer los individuos que hablan [...]” (Foucault, 1999, p. 40)¹⁴; second, the speech societies, which produce them “[...] para hacerlos circular en un espacio cerrado, distribuyéndolos según reglas estrictas y sin que los detentadores sean desposeídos de la función de distribución” (Foucault, 1999, p. 41)¹⁵; third, the doctrine, which “[...] tiende a la difusión; y a través de la puesta en común de un solo y mismo conjunto de discursos, los individuos, tan numerosos como se quiera suponer, definen su dependencia recíproca” (Foucault, 1999, p. 43)¹⁶; and finally, social adequacy, manifested above all by means of education: “[...] todo sistema de educación es una forma política de mantener o de modificar la adecuación de los discursos, con los saberes y los poderes que implican” (Foucault, 1999, p. 45)¹⁷.

From Michel Foucault’s view on the mechanisms of organizing discourse, we retain two ideas: the first, that documents provide systems of domination with a resource to subjugate those administered, who are disciplined by means of the document. The second, that systems of domination have the right to produce documents, but at the same time deny this right to those that they administer. Certainly, these mechanisms serve to explain how bureaucracies and document systems worked throughout the 19th and 20th centuries; but

13 Translation: “It is a matter of determining the conditions of its use, imposing a certain number of rules on the individuals who deliver the discourse and, this way, prevent everyone from having access to them. Rarification, this time, of the speaking subjects; no one will enter the order of discourse if they do not meet certain requirements or if they are not qualified to do so, in the first place. For greater precision: not all parts of the discourse are equally accessible and intelligible; some are clearly protected (differentiated and differentiating) while others seem almost open to all winds and are made available without prior restriction to any speaking subject” (Foucault, 1999, p. 38-39, editorial translation).

14 Translation: “[...] defines the qualification that individuals who speak must have [...]” (Foucault, 1999, p. 40, editorial translation).

15 Translation: “[...] to make them circulate in a closed space, distributing them according to strict rules and without the holders being deprived of the role of distribution” (Foucault, 1999, p. 41, editorial translation).

16 Translation: “[...] tends to diffusion; and by means of the communication of a single set of discourses, individuals, as numerous as one wishes to suppose, define their reciprocal dependence” (Foucault, 1999, p. 43, editorial translation).

17 Translation: “[...] every education system is a political way of maintaining or modifying the adequacy of discourses with the knowledge and powers they involve” (Foucault, 1999, p. 45, editorial translation).

no social dimension of the archives arises from them. The next section will discuss a different model, the model of the superabundance of discursive freedoms, rather than the scarcity of them, that seems to govern information societies.

Simulation and simulacrum

Up to this point in Western tradition, documents had a form and a background, they were the representation of something that is represented; in short, the documents manifested a distance between the signifier and the signified, and it was necessary for one to make an effort to ensure that both were linked, an effort that was often the responsibility of the owners of the documents. In contemporary information societies, this discrimination has disappeared and this matter exhausts itself in the signifier. Below is an example.

Jean Baudrillard began his best-known study on the culture of simulacrum using a brief report by Jorge Luis Borges, *Del rigor en la ciencia*: the cartographers of the empire that Borges narrates reached such a level of perfection that they were able to draw a full-scale map of the country, that is, a map the size of the country. It is clear that this map was not sustainable, and in fact its fragments were scattered throughout the empire; but, essentially, representation could well replace that which is represented. For Baudrillard, in this struggle for pre-eminence between signifier and signified, it was possible to go one step further: the first did not replace the second, but, on the contrary, the latter ceased to exist: “La simulación no corresponde a un territorio, a una referencia, a una sustancia, sino que es la generación por los modelos de algo real sin origen ni realidad: lo hiperreal” (Baudrillard, 1978, p. 5-6)¹⁸.

In other words, for Baudrillard not only is there no distance between the signifier and the signified, between representation and what is represented, but the latter no longer has a place: everything is reduced to a representation without any basis in reality, to a signifier that has no meaning. It is the concept of hyper-reality that the French thinker introduced into Western culture at the end of the 20th century:

No se trata ya de imitación ni de reiteración, incluso ni de parodia, sino de una suplantación de lo real por los signos de lo real, es decir, de una operación de disuasión de todo proceso real por su doble operativo, máquina de índole reproductiva, programática, impecable, que ofrece todos los signos de lo real y, en cortocircuito, todas sus hiperrealidades (Baudrillard, 1978, p. 7)¹⁹.

Baudrillard's hyper-reality revealed a very subtle mechanism of discipline, of obedience without discussion, of connection between systems of domination and information systems, in contemporary societies. For Foucault, domination required the exercise of certain censorship,

18 Translation: “Simulation does not correspond to a territory, a reference, a substance, but is the generation by models of something real without origin or reality: the hyper-real” (Baudrillard, 1978, p. 5-6, editorial translation).

19 Translation: “It is no longer a matter of imitation or reiteration, not even of parody, but of supplanting what is real by the signs of what is real, that is, supplanting of an operation to dissuade the entire reality process by its operative double, a machine of a reproductive, programmatic, impeccable nature, which offers all the signs of reality and, in short circuit, all its adventures” (Baudrillard, 1978, p. 7, editorial translation).

physical and intellectual, and required a certain amount of violence. However – and we believe we have not strayed too far from Baudrillard’s conception – domination, in our modern societies, resides in absolute transparency: all signifiers are freely available to everyone in all places and at all times because it does not matter whether they are damaged, since they are only signifiers, representations without any real substance and about which it is not possible to make ethical decisions because, in the absence of meaning, the propositions derived from them are not only volatile, but also lack truth value. Baudrillard used the example of news of an attack: all interpretations would be possible simultaneously, from the left, the right, the center, the police, the extremists on both sides.

Todo ello es verdadero al mismo tiempo y la búsqueda de pruebas, es decir, de la objetividad de los hechos, no es capaz de detener semejante vértigo interpretativo. La cuestión es que nos hallamos en medio de una lógica de la simulación que no tiene ya nada que ver con una lógica de los hechos (Baudrillard, 1978, p. 36-37)²⁰.

All the information is at our disposal, but, unlike what happened at the beginning of the 20th century, this does not generate any conflict, because we do not need to decide which part of it we internalize and which part we discard; we can delegate these types of decisions, a delegation that systems of domination would know how to use. In this sense, Baudrillard anticipated the way in which contemporary societies function on the Internet, the way in which systems of domination manage information and how those administered also do so under an apparent equality of conditions: as the *mise en scène* of a script that does not have a screenwriter and it has not yet been written. Our collective behavior on social networks, even segmented ones (*Facebook* users are not *TikTok* users), is illustrative in this sense. It seems that we have recovered the notion of “everything is an archive”, since we all have the right to produce and receive information, in multiple and unpredictable ways; however, for Baudrillard, this information is inscribed “[...] en una economía política del signo” (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 19)²¹, which is constantly exhausted in its constant consumption, there is nothing to archive.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above considerations, we revisit some previous already known conceptions about the relationships between document systems and systems of domination, with the intention of showing some of the ideas that have hovered over Western thought in this regard. Such ideas are as follows:

20 Translation: “All of this is true at the same time and the search for proof, that is, for the objectivity of the facts, is not capable of stopping such interpretative vertigo. The point is that we find ourselves in the middle of a logic of simulation that no longer has anything to do with a logic of facts” (Baudrillard, 1978, p. 36-37, editorial translation).

21 Translation: “[...] in a political economy of the sign” (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 19, our translation).

1. The systems of domination of the last century in which Western societies have developed have generally been systems of administrative framework domination with a legal basis.
2. Such systems of domination need document systems for their regular operation, reason why they produce the documents they need and not others.
3. The consequence is that systems of domination need to establish rules to maintain the limits of documents that can or should be produced.
4. Since the end of the 20th century, however, systems of domination have changed their strategy, releasing information massively, be they produced elsewhere or produced “*on-the-fly*”.
5. In any case, both the limitation strategy and the release strategy are mechanisms that systems of domination have used and use to make their dominated act in accordance with certain ends.
6. As far as systems of domination achieve this goal, they achieve disciplined societies.

Although many topics have not been addressed in this text, we believe that the next chapter of this research, which will not lose continuity after this work, should rethink the ways in which, not only document management, but Western thought in general, have addressed the rules for producing information on the Network, as they mean, on the one hand, a weakening of the possibilities of establishing stable value propositions; and, on the other, an enablement of another cognitive model based on the fluidity and delegation of memory.

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