The principle of universalization in Jürgen Habermas discursive theory

Abstract

This scientific article is part of a research aimed at investigating the implications and interpretations arising from the transformation of the positioning of the principle of universalization (U) operated in the theory of discourse by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, especially from some of his works from the 1980s and 90. The cognitivist claim of discourse ethics grounds morality in the face of the possibility of rational discursive reconstruction of the justifications for norms. The universalization test is part of the rationale, but in what sense? In order to dispel skepticism regarding the pretense of practical justification, Habermas rethinks the Kantian relationship between morality and law. More precisely, in the face of complex societies marked by the Democratic State of Law and the use of practical discourses other than morality to justify social practices, the legitimacy of norms involves making explicit the discursive relationship between law, morality and politics. It is within the scope of this challenge that the German philosopher has been modifying the formulation and positioning of his principle of universalization (U) over time, as well as its relationship with the principle of discourse (D) and, later, with the principle of democracy (In). After going through this path, we launch the hypothesis, according to which, the emphasis that Habermas gives to the law in Facticity and Validity together with the repositioning of the moral point of view, allows to think in a dialogical way the social interaction as communicative praxis without subjects.