O lugar da desinformação na cognição social ou como lidar com propriedades da cognição que abrem espaço para a falseabilidade

Abstract

According to neuroscientist Miguel Nicolelis (2020), responsible for exoskeletons powered by mental commands, disinformation processes are part of social cognition. The delegation of mental content processing to other cognitions or cognitive networks considered reliable mechanisms of belief production and the attraction of the human species for symbolic information, which only exist between brains with language, are intrinsic compulsions to the complex informational system that originates us and, because of its teleodynamics, it always offers gaps for incoherent and even harmful informational articulations. Faced with this observation, we are interested in focusing on the elaboration of narratives that, by knowing the cognitive origin of disinformation, can better interrupt and rearrange such processes of falsification. There is interest in investing in this understanding because, due to its scientificity and relevance, it can leverage efforts to combat disinformation, provide subsidies for the disarticulation of mechanisms considered reliable and highlight characteristics of cognition as a social process that includes the division of cognitive tasks and the co-responsibility. The objective of this research is to analyze the aforementioned compulsions and support interventions committed to social interest. The philosophy of information as presented to us by Floridi (2011) and Deacon (2012), offers a theoretical overview attuned to the objectives pursued. In this bias, individuals are subsystems specialized in linguistic (rational, semiotic) modeling of mental contents, originated in perception and learning, in order to make them accessible and useful to the system to which they belong.